Statement of the Case against Boeing

On December 29, 2024, Jeju Flight 2216 was traveling from Thailand to Muan International Airport in South Korea aboard a Boeing 737-800 aircraft. Of the 181 passengers and crew members on board, 179 lost their lives, making it one of the deadliest aviation disasters in South Korean history.

Although the final report of the official investigation has been delayed, sufficient information is now available to support several preliminary conclusions. 

As the aircraft approached Muan Airport, air traffic control cleared the flight to land and issued a warning about bird activity in the area. This was a known risk, as Muan International Airport is located near the Muan Tidal Flats, a coastal wetland that serves as a habitat and migratory stopover for large populations of birds. Shortly after receiving the warning, the pilots observed a flock of Baikal Teals in their path and initiated a go-around, a standard maneuver in which a landing attempt is discontinued so the aircraft can safely reposition for another approach. 

During the go-around, the flight suffered a bird strike during its approach to landing, which damaged both engines. Technical failures may have led the pilots to shut down the less damaged left engine. 

This Boeing 737-800 NG airplane immediately experienced cascading failures in its electric and hydraulic systems. The aircraft was built using outdated 1960s technology that unquestionably failed. The airplane experienced asymmetrical thrust. Pilot throttle commands may have been ineffective. Nearly all of the systems needed for a safe landing: the landing gear including the brakes failed to deploy. The thrust reversers, flaps, slats, and ailerons, all failed. These safety systems are specifically intended to assist the pilots in landing and bringing the airplane to a safe stop on the runway after a bird strike.

Despite all these technical failures, the pilots remarkably managed to execute a go-around, return to the airport, and correctly line the airplane up with the runway. However, without assistance from those safety systems, the airplane overshot the start of the runway, touching down too fast and too far down the runway where it began sliding on its belly. With ineffective reverse thrusters, no brakes, and no ailerons, the pilots could not stop the airplane. It overshot the runway and collided with a deadly concrete-reinforced dirt mound supporting nonfrangible localizer antennas. The airplane exploded on impact, causing the death of all but two of the 181 human beings onboard.

The truth is that it took the combination of all these errors to produce this air crash. Laws of both the U.S. and Korea are designed to compare and weigh the severity of fault on the part of each defendant whose actions contributed to this air crash.

First and foremost, if Boeing’s safety systems had functioned as intended, the flight would have landed safely and come to a safe stop on the runway, well before the deadly mound with no one hurt. In our professional opinion, Boeing must bear the greatest degree of responsibility for this accident. Its culpability was the most egregious. Boeing had the most time, the most money, and the highest level of expertise available to it. Its reliance on outdated technology for more than 50 years, is inexcusable. Boeing ought to have corrected the deficiencies in its technology, especially in light of the fact that it was actually aware of the problem well before this air crash occurred. 

Next, if Muan Airport’s bird mitigation team had managed to chase away the birds before the flight attempted to land, there never would have been a bird strike. The landing would have been normal and safe.

However, in our professional opinion, the second most egregious error was the construction of the concrete-reinforced berm supporting nonfrangible localizer antennas. The airport had several years, adequate funding, and expert advice, yet it ignored that advice when building and improving the localizer installation.. If the airport had constructed a proper support with frangible localizer antennas, the airplane would most likely have not exploded. There may have been injuries, but most, if not all, of the passengers would have survived.

Finally, if proven that in the intense pressure of the moment, the pilots mistakenly shut down the wrong engine, Jeju Air must bear a relatively minor share of fault. They were in an emergency situation without the assistance of most of the airplane’s safety systems, with only seconds to decide, and all without the immediate advice of anyone. We think they should bear only a small portion of the comparative fault.